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INTRODUCTION (the Mayor of some great city):

The Mayor stepped up to the podium. He gazed upon the crowd, making sure that all in attendance were fixed upon him, anticipating his impending speech. “My fellow New Yorkers, we have a housing crisis. This crisis will not solve itself! And this crisis will not abate, let alone disappear, by relying on the private sector alone. We, in government, must tackle this problem head on. We must provide low cost financing to build more housing. The only solution to the housing crisis is to build our way out of it, and that can only happen with government support. But that support will not come without strings attached. The public good must form the foundation of our mutual efforts, of our partnership with banks, and developers – for-profit and not-for-profit alike. We will place a premium on expanding housing supply. We will make sure that banks participate so that our pubic dollars can be stretched as far as possible. We will place our emphasis on large projects so that costs can be effectively spread over the many units developed. And what will be at the heart, and form the guiding principle, of this effort? We will make sure that the majority of units produced will be AFFORDABLE housing units. Let me repeat. No government subsidy will be available unless most of the housing produced will be affordable. It is time to put homelessness behind us. We hold the future in our hands and working together, we will realize a future that, instead of homelessness guiding policy, the unhoused will become a distant memory. Let me introduce our housing commissioner to fill in the details of our proposed program. Thank you for joining us today.”

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Fifty years ago, Gerald Ford was President; the country was in a recession; inflation was raging at over 13%; the unemployment rate was about 9%, up from 5% a year earlier. New York City was facing bankruptcy with no federal help in sight (October 30, 1975 New York Daily News Headline – Ford to City, Drop Dead); the city’s top housing official refused to spend readily available federal funds to give residents a fighting chance at saving their homes and neighborhoods. Fires raged across the inner city, particularly in the South Bronx where hundreds of buildings were set ablaze each month. Fire departments in the South Bronx, twelve in all from 1974-76, were shuttered; displacement of thousands of residents began, culminating in the forced displacement of about 250,000 residents. Anyone with the means to leave, did, often fleeing to an area further north with the fires following close behind. But many, determined to fight the arson, abandonment and neglect, remained to fight and preserve home and community.

In 1975, I began working at my first post-college job at Casita Maria Settlement House on Simpson Street in the South Bronx, moving into the neighborhood on Fox Street shortly thereafter. By the end of the decade, the entire area looked like some of the worst neighborhoods in modern-day Kyiv.

If you had lived in the South Bronx, did a Rip Van Winkle in 1975, and slept nearly 50 years, upon awakening you would hardly know where you were. Instead of looking at vacant land and buildings stretching across expanses accounting for up to 80% of many areas, you would see newly renovated buildings and sparkling high rises. By 2024, the Bronx became the number one borough for new housing development. In fact, current data indicates that the Bronx had more housing developed than three of the other five boroughs combined. Some areas are seeing restaurants pop up where in the past there were only Botanicas, bodegas, Chinese take-out, storefronts selling cuchifritos, and liquor stores.  Area median incomes are on the rise, promising more diversity in retail and consumer choices.

But all this progress comes at a price. Median monthly asking rents in the Bronx are now in excess of $3,000, making these units affordable only to those making at least $120,000 a year. Median income in the South Bronx hovers somewhere between $35,000 and $40,000, substantially higher than a decade earlier, thanks in no small part to gentrification. Homelessness is on the rise due to the lack of housing existing residents are able to afford, exacerbated by the recent migrant crisis. Food insecurity has become increasingly worse as Bronx food pantries, half of which shuttered during the COVID pandemic, struggle to keep food on their shelves. Substance abuse continues, with the Bronx having the highest number of overdose deaths in the city. And the problem may go beyond illegal drug dealing. Take a walk up and down 149^th Street from the Grand Concourse to Melrose and there a appears to be an excessive number of pharmacies, all laid out in the same manner – basic hair and body stuff in the front, and over half of the small storefront where medications are kept protected by security glass in the back. It made me consider how this area looked like the urban equivalent of rural Appalachia at the height of its opioid crisis, with its surfeit of pharmacies and prescription drug overdoses.

DON’T MOVE, IMPROVE

Fifty years ago, the South Bronx was being destroyed mostly from without, and yet there still remained a sense of community that made life tolerable. Everyone knew who their neighbors were. There were no such thing as “latchkey kids.” Seniors did not have to worry about life-threatening isolation. Resource networks thrived, whether the news was about public benefits, job openings, or cultural events. No one went hungry. What little people had, they shared. It was in this context – neighborhood destruction and supportive community – that I began my career work in community development.

Was there crime? Were there gangs? Were there drugs, family disputes, revenge killings, street fights, public drunkards? Yes. Of course there were. However, somehow it was different. Everyone knew what areas to stay away from and who to watch out for and watch over. Regardless of whatever else was going on, “the block” was always a safe haven. For the most part, there was mutual respect, even from those involved in criminal activity. Unlike the subsequent crack era, drug dealers did not take over entire blocks, sell drugs outside peoples’ homes or near schools, or recruit children over the objection of parents.  Because there was a shared sense of community, illegal activity occurred but neighbors were respected. But as things became more desperate in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when residents began cannibalizing buildings for whatever value remained – mostly cooper piping, wiring and flashing – buildings with organized resident associations or targeted for upgrade by local groups were protected.

At the settlement house, I worked with youth after school and through the evening. On my own, after hours I opened the facility up to young adults. We would play basketball for hours, followed up with conversations about what was going on in the neighborhood. This is how I met Leon Potts, Robert Foster, Eric Wingate and others from Kelly Street, or to be more precise, the 900-block of Kelly Street locally known as Banana Kelly. From these discussions, we eventually formed a community development corporation, sponsored block parties, planted a community garden, and “liberated” three abandoned buildings for “sweat equity” renovation. Importantly, however, all of these efforts did not just constitute development of real estate, but “community” development. We were united in purpose. We depended on one another, knowing full well that only through cooperation could we succeed. Young and old, everyone was able to contribute to the collective effort, from one adult member with interior demolition experience who helped supply tools to an older member who prepared tasty treats, “jibaro envuelto,” at our block parties, and every form of participation in between. Together, we accomplished what at the time, in that place, in those circumstances seemed not only contextually incongruent, but impossible. We adopted the slogan, “Don’t Move, Improve,” which in those words or at least in sentiment, became the mantra for community development throughout the city.

WHEN CDCs WERE THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN

In those early days, it was a struggle but we made consistent progress, as did other community development groups throughout the city. Preservation efforts slowly displaced the unofficial policy of planned shrinkage, even though the city still prioritized demolition of vacant properties where no local group targeted the buildings for redevelopment. But all this changed due to a confluence of events that brought unprecedented opportunity to community preservation and rebuilding efforts in the mid-to late 1980s.

The first and most important component of this new age, ironically, was based upon past devastation. In 1976, in the midst of the city’s fiscal crisis, accusations were made that the city was engaging in “phantom bookkeeping.”  The charge was based upon the city issuing general obligation bonds backed up by real estate taxes – they never collected! Responding to that charge, the City Council passed a local law that came to be known as the “quick vesting law.”  Under the law, landlords would lose title to their buildings for tax arrears after only year instead of what had been three or more years. The law was a fiscal measure, but ended up inadvertently creating the second largest system of public housing in the country.

The city faced a dilemma with tens of thousands of units now under its ownership. The City could not simply sell off these newly acquired buildings due to a moratorium on auctions. The moratorium was a product of a report issued by New York City Comptroller that found buildings sold at auction were further disinvested, continued not to pay taxes, and recycled back into foreclosure again a few years later – in worse shape than before. The city, through its housing agency, HDC, had no authority to operate these buildings. And, as is commonly known, the city was effectively bankrupt.

In 1979, Ed Koch was elected Mayor. His administration needed to immediately resolve this dilemma. A new housing agency, HPD, with the requisite authority, was formed. Community groups like Banana Kelly were tapped to manage many of the properties. Resident associations were encouraged to enter into leases with the city with the eventual goal of becoming low income cooperatives. A central management division was formed to operate buildings where no local organization or resident group was willing and able to take over. But still, there was that problem of where the money would come from.

The previous City administration’s housing official refused to spend federal block grant money it had received during Beame’s mayoral term. Hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of Community Development Block Grant money was available, but there was one additional hurdle to overcome. These funds could not be used due to a “maintenance of effort” proscription written into the law. The city needed a waiver, which they received in return for a commitment to develop an aggressive program for disposing of/selling these properties. The creation of this “in rem” program (so-called based on the type of legal procedure, “against the thing,” the city used to take title), kept community groups busy managing and (marginally) upgrading these buildings for much of the next decade.

The second major ingredient contributing to a resurgence of New York City housing preservation and development came from an unlikely source – the IRS and the Reagan administration. In 1986 the Internal Revenue of 1954 was amended to create the Low Income Housing Tax Credit provision, creating the program that would become the major source of low income housing development, remaining so to this day.

The third major part of what made up this brief golden age of community development had to do with the city’s finances. Starting in the mid-1980s the city started generating annual surpluses of around one-half billion dollars. With its newfound fiscal resurgence, the city regained control of its budget and borrowing power, allowing it to get back into the housing preservation and production business. It did this through a succession of Ten Year Plans.

All the elements were in place – hundreds of acres of vacant land and thousands of vacant apartments; the city generating huge budget surpluses; a new federal program that not only provided a new tool for development, but allowed corporate investors to participate and, as long as the projects did not default, generate profits; a community development sector with groups able and motivated to participate in major housing preservation production. There were other contributing factors for New York City going from receivership by the state to the most productive generator of new and upgraded housing preservation in the country. One other major factor that impacted the increase in housing production involved two lawsuits brought by the Coalition for the Homeless. Courts found that under the New York State Social Services Law and Constitution, New York City had a legal obligation to provide shelter to those without housing. Besides the burgeoning homeless crisis, there was also the AIDS crisis and crack epidemic. CDCs rose to the challenge, throwing themselves into the fray to address these problems. Foundations and other philanthropic entities, following the trend of government CDC support, began again to invest heavily in community rebuilding efforts.

And yet, overall, CDC efforts generally focused mostly on two approaches – physical redevelopment and service delivery. “Professionalization” became the new buzzword for CDCs. Much of the money that came from charitable organizations was used for “comprehensive community initiatives,” social services, and economic development. Some groups, including Banana Kelly – a group founded on grass roots, self-help resident initiatives – began to treat their members, not as partners but as clients, like children who needed guidance in how to live their lives, raise their children, conduct themselves as good tenants, and overcome dependency on public supports. “Community” effectively lost its place within the community development movement. Concurrently, most CDCs separated themselves from organizing and advocacy efforts, becoming in some cases adversaries with advocacy and organizing groups that once were seen as partners. To make matters worse, when many CDCs became the equivalent of 1960s-style multi-services agencies, there was one group of CDCs that attempted to break free from the major CDC trade association, attempting to take much of its funding with them, on the grounds that the Association of Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD) was too involved with advocacy and not sufficiently committed to fighting on behalf of CDCs to gain more support for rebuilding efforts, like getting higher developer fees. This golden age did not last long.  

SUBSIDIZING PROFIT

The beginning of the end of this golden age of CDCs started mid-way through the Koch Administration, slowed down during Dinkins one term, heated up when Giuliani was mayor, and accelerated through the Bloomberg, DeBlasio, and Adams tenures. Public policy began to favor private, for-profit development and ownership over not-for-profit development.  Without the political protection that comes from an active, engaged membership with a vested interest in the organization’s work, it was only a matter of time before CDCs lost their status as a favored producer and overseer of low income housing. Truth be told, the status was illusory.  CDCs ruled because there was no outside market for housing in their catchment areas. Once a market developed for housing in areas previously referred to as “ghettos,” private, for-profit developers pushed their way into the city’s development pipeline, anxious to take advantage of city subsidies and to turn every aspect of the process, from planning, to development, to construction and property management, into a profit center. 

Ultimately, for-profit housing developers out-professionalized and out-capitalized all but the most successful local housing groups. According to a 2017 ANHD report, over 74% of all city-financed housing construction deals, representing 80% of all housing units created, went to for-profit developers. Generally, over the past ten to fifteen years, for-profit developers were approved for twice as many affordable housing projects as not-for-profit developers.

The question that should come to mind: how can for-profit developers afford to build so much “affordable housing,” especially given that in areas like the ones Banana Kelly is active in, the upper half of existing residents can only afford rents of about $950 a month. New York City has a diverse array of term sheets that serve as options for obtaining city financing. Given the diversity, it is helpful to generalize. Most projects require that 15% of units be set aside for homeless families. These families would typically come with some form of city subsidy. There is usually a requirement that the next tier provide for extremely low or very low income households. Taking very low income households as the next tier, 25% of the units might need to be set aside. A typical household of four would need to make between $75,000 and $80,000 a year and for a 2-BR pay over $1700 a month in rent, and for a 3-BR pay over $2,000 a month. Some New York City finance programs do better, and some worse in terms of meeting the needs of the most marginalized, and at risk of becoming homeless, residents. However, because the primary focus remains on increasing housing supply and leveraging private lending to maximize the impact of city funds, the benefits of city subsidized housing remains limited.  As a result, only a relatively small portion of low-income residents are able to access these housing opportunities, leaving many still struggling to secure stable and affordable homes.

Regarding homelessness, city sources show that nightly stays in shelters increased 175% between 2000 and 2020 (before the migrant crisis). With the increase in the unhoused due to the migrant crisis, the nightly population living in city shelters doubled. The Coalition for the Homeless adds to those numbers by including those living in the streets, along with those who are doubled up and most at risk of eviction. Using this approach they estimate that the homeless population in New York City exceeds 350,000 (as of November 2024).

CONCLUSION

When public policy prioritizes increasing housing supply over accessibility and affordability for those most risk of homelessness, it is predictable that homelessness is an issue that not only will remain unresolved, but will continue to get worse the more housing we build. When housing policy prioritizes maximizing private (bank) financing, so as to minimize city subsidies to stretch public resources, it is understandable why the majority of units rent at level unattainable to local residents. When housing policy prioritizes for-profit development as opposed to not-for-profit housing development, one of, if not, the most critical needs of human existence, child development, household stability, life for tenants is objectivized and converted into little or nothing more than an entry on a balance sheet. We continue to subsidize profit such that we fail to reach those most in need, and those most at risk of homelessness. It is like trying to solve food insecurity by making Bluefin tuna, one of the most expensive foods on the planet, more available for purchase.

CASE STUDY: BANANA KELLY COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION

As general support funding has dried up and competition for housing deals increased, CDCs found themselves at a disadvantage in terms of capital, capacity and political access. The ramifications of that trend are beyond what could be viewed as loss of market share. Many CDCs have gone out of business, with their housing portfolios transferred to for-profit developers. Others have survived by selling off portions of their portfolios, which have mostly been sold to for-profit real estate firms. A group of New York City CDCs have responded to this trend by creating a new organization, a not-for-profit, collaborative organization called the Joint Ownership Entity of New York City (“JOENYC”). By agreeing to consolidate balance sheets, making these groups better able to sustain themselves and compete for larger deals, the JOENYC has had additional benefits. Stopping and, in some cases, reversing the trend of not-for-profits selling off low income buildings to the private sector,  some for-profit owned properties have been purchased by JOENYC members.

As promising as the JOENYC collaborative is, it represents only a partial solution to maintaining and expanding stewardship of low income housing by organizations whose mission includes preserving affordability. CDCs must return to their roots, re-establish meaningful support and accountability ties to their residents, and generally transform from professional service providers to legitimate community institutions.

This was the kind of decision Banana Kelly Community Improvement Association, Inc. made over a decade ago when it changed its by-laws and became a mutual housing association, with active resident associations, a Resident Council from which a plurality of board members are elected, local public interest members who, along with Resident Council members, make up a majority of the board, and at-large public interest members with professional backgrounds filling out the remainder of board seats. With this change, Banana Kelly effectively turned the organization back to the residents and the neighborhoods it serves. This change in organizational structure requires ongoing commitment and plenty of work to keep it going. Supplementing everyday challenges which at times are daunting, the COVID pandemic placed enormous strain on prioritizing social/political maintenance of the organization, while also providing for core responsibilities, such as critical property management, development, organizing, social services, along with the soft, community-building initiatives such as Summer Camp and After-School programs, solar, hydroponic gardening, supportive housing resident support, eviction prevention, court-appointed housing administration, healthy living, and more.

Annually, Banana Kelly provides direct services to between 6,500 and 7,000 residents and support services to the community at large. Banana Kelly owns/operates 67 multifamily buildings comprising approximately 1,700 units and is committed to maintaining rents at levels that are truly affordable for the local community. Though primarily operating in the Hunts Point-Longwood area, over the past dozen or so years, the organization has expanded its work to include Mott Haven, West Concourse, Morrisania, University Heights, East Harlem and West Harlem. Banana Kelly maintains its main office at 863 Prospect Avenue, with a satellite office located at 941 Intervale Avenue that houses social services staff and programs. Current Programs and Projects:

Many of the housing projects mentioned below were originally scheduled to close in 2019 or 2020. However, due to COVID and based on city budgeting priorities, the projects were delayed or, in some cases, split up into different phases.

In 2018, Banana Kelly took over four severely distressed properties from a notorious landlord who converted rent stabilized units into emergency housing for the homeless, ultimately making hundreds of millions through the so-called Cluster Site program. Two of the buildings removed from this slumlord have been fully renovated and the other two are in the process of being renovated.

The Third Party Transfer Program transfers tax foreclosed properties to qualified local housing groups. COVID delayed the closings and we expect construction closing on the occupied properties in 2025.

The ANCP Program is New York City’s low income cooperative housing program. Banana Kelly is involved in the development of two buildings in East Harlem, scheduled to have their construction closings in 2025 as well.

Working with the East Harlem Community Land Trust (“CLT”) and in collaboration with another mutual housing association – Community Assisted Tenant Controlled Housing, Inc. (“CATCH”) – we have been working to convert four buildings into its own local mutual housing association operating under the oversight of a community controlled CLT. To date, two buildings are completely renovated, with the other two buildings currently being rehabilitated.

In terms of resident engagement, our community organizers work to expand the Banana Kelly Resident Council. The Council engages in advocacy and organizing around self-identified issues that relate to the expansion and sustainability of affordable housing. The Council, which currently has over two dozen members, also works closely with our Executive Staff to improve the management of our portfolio.  All of this work is critical since each of the Resident Council member represent current and potential future members of the board of directors.

The Healthy Communities Initiative was established ten years ago to create new and improved healthy food outlets and venues for our residents. This initiative increases access to healthy and affordable food, raising awareness about healthy lifestyle choices. It includes a key partnership with New York Common Pantry. This initiative is complemented by our three garden sites, including Kelly Street Garden in Longwood, College Avenue Garden of Hope in Mott Haven, and the Bryant Avenue Garden in Hunts Point. At 970 Prospect Ave we recently entered a cooperation agreement with the Mi Oh My Hydroponic Farms, LLC to set up the newly developed Hydroponic Farm Academy that will grow micro-greens and mushrooms inside the facility and vegetables outside during growing season. Once the interior and exterior operations are up and running, the facility will be open for participation and training for residents.

Since 2017, Banana Kelly has been a member of Stabilizing NYC, a citywide coalition that combats the loss of affordable housing units at the hands of predatory equity companies and defends low-income residents in predatory equity buildings from harassment and eviction. This coalition consists of 17 grassroots organizations from across the five boroughs, a research organization, and a legal services provider.

Partnering with three other local community development corporations and with the Lower East Side People’s Credit Union, Banana Kelly launched a mobile van bringing our members the opportunity to join a credit union. Our South Bronx community has a long history of limited access to banks, forcing our residents to utilize other methods of banking such as check cashing businesses to pay bills, obtain money orders and case checks. Working with Webster Bank and the Lower East Side People’s Credit Union we are providing the opportunity for our residents to save and better manage their financial matters. Since we began last year we have provided information and literature to hundreds of residents, with dozens opening bank accounts.  And in late 2024, the Lower East Side Credit Union held a Grand Opening of its first branch location at Banana Kelly’s 941 Intervale Avenue building. 

Current Leadership Structure

The level of activity involved in maintaining the scope and breadth of activities briefly outlined above requires leadership at all levels of the organization, from residents taking an active interest in their buildings, understanding how the quality of life for their families depends on their active involvement in local affairs and public policy; it includes participation on the Resident Council, which prioritizes the organization’s advocacy agenda; organizers work tirelessly in facilitating the creation of tenant associations, expanding the Resident Council and providing updates and connections with local and citywide organizing efforts; case managers intervene in peoples’ lives, when asked, to prevent evictions, ensure entitlements, and protect residents and clients with developmental disabilities and facilitate their paths to maximum independence; property managers must constantly balance responsibilities to third parties, the need to keep projects financially viable and the organizational mandate to prevent eviction for other than anti-social and criminal behavior; fiscal officers must manage funds while waiting up to two or more years for receipt of approved funds from government grants; project managers and administrative assistants for whom there is no such thing as an eight-hour day ,provide the glue that keeps the organization running; the board of directors cannot do their jobs of governance oversight without understanding our mission, our work in pursuit of that mission, and having a commitment to provide the guidance necessary to assist the President and CEO. All roads lead to and from the CEO, without whom the organization either falls apart or lapses into a dying entity without common purpose, lacking relevance, devoid of dynamic vitality, and destined to eventually fade into insignificance.

Banana Kelly’s CEO, like the CEOs and other managers within the community development field, has awesome responsibilities. For all CEOs of community development corporations, real success is only possible if they define responsibilities as working for those served by the institution, if they see the job as more than counting housing units, enlarging caseloads, and producing an impressive bottom line, if they define their own success through the success of others, if they truly care, are motivated by and feel both the pain and the joy of those they work with and for.

The field of community development provides opportunities for the expression of talent and capacity not generally available in a mainstream economy dependent upon mass markets, mass marketing, programmed algorithms, and a massified consumer base. Due to a deficient education system, elitism, racism, and other social isms, local talent is often ignored, overlooked, or disparaged. But in the field of community development, where each and every tenant, client, member, and program participant is viewed as an individual whose legitimate desires, needs, and talents are important, and where the organization is structured to work with and enhance those attributes, true talent is more often recognized, appreciated, and put to use.

Banana Kelly’s current CEO experience is emblematic of how community development entities, if properly governed, can recognize and develop talent, which comes back to benefit the organization, its mission and its people. Hope Burgess came to Banana Kelly in 2002 as a student intern. At the time, she was attending college, raising two children, and living in a domestic violence shelter. She started as a receptionist with some menial administrative duties. But she became interested in our programs, especially those dealing with social work, which was here field of study. In her spare time, she volunteered to work with program staff. Over time, she demonstrated her commitment and talents and became a program manager. Still, she was not satisfied, and through one of our programs that housed clients with developmental disabilities, she became interested in the operations of our buildings, assisting tenants and holding the outside property management company accountable. A few years later, given that she had line and managerial experience in every Banana Kelly program, she was designated as Chief Operating Officer, not because she was offered the job and accepted it, but because she was essentially doing the job without the title. This is how she rose up the ranks at Banana Kelly, by taking on more responsibility until it became clear she needed to be officially recognized in that capacity to be as effective as she could be. In fact, the only job she was offered at Banana Kelly was the job of President and CEO, a position she earned through years of hard work and dedication.

Hope’s story is one of the unrecognized benefits of community development. Yet, Hope’s story is not unique, even though many find it necessary to leave an organization, only to return later when their benefit to the group became clearer. And there is no doubt that Hope Burgess, and the so many others in the field, would have done well without a group like Banana Kelly. But would society do as well? I doubt it.

In closing, funders should recognize the value of CDCs, but also appreciate how difficult, and yet necessary, it is to operate in a field and with an approach within an economic/political context that is absolutely antagonistic to our missions – unless we consider as our main responsibility the management of marginalized people, providing just enough support to keep them docile, disorganized, self-deprecating, and dependent. CDCs need support.

To board members of CDCs, I appreciate how hard it is to govern responsibly and I recognize that one job of the board is to make sure that the most qualified person available is running the organization. But it would help to look deep at local talent and accept that it takes more than an elite college degree and a polished exterior to run a CDC, with hundreds of employees, thousands of housing units, and daily challenges that will bury all but the most committed, empathetic and resourceful individuals. And if a big part of the motivation is not love, the best result will not be achievable.

To government and elected officials, we have a substantial population of people who need public housing. Short of that ever becoming available, if there is ever to be a real commitment to addressing homelessness as effectively as possible, it will only happen with reliance on not-for-profit community development corporations. There is plenty to do by the private sector, including roles that allow for profitmaking. But when it comes to long term ownership, remove profit from the final disposition of government subsidized housing. Provide support to, and rely on, CDCs to own, manage and operate low income housing, and prioritize those projects where the people and communities most impacted by development are given a say, through any number of proven mechanisms ranging from tenant control and management, to mutual housing associations, to community land trusts.